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ABSTRACT
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The primary purpose of this research was to determine the
prospect for the involvement of the for-profit developer in
affordable- family housing in California. The research was
conducted in interviews with individuals from several for-
profit development firms as well as Bridge Housing
Corporation, a non-community based non-profit firm, lenders,
and specialists from various local and state governmental
agencies.
The central theme of the research was; to define the role
of the for-profit developer in the affordable- family housing
industry. The thesis is organized around that theme: Chapter
I is written from the perspective of the developer and is
dedicated to discussing the institutional framework within
which the developer must operate; State policy and
legislation, the lending environment, and the relative details
of pertinent subsidy programs. Chapters II-IV are project case
studies written from the perspective of the developer. All
three studies involve for-profit/non-profit joint venture
partnerships in the development of mixed-income affordable
housing projects. Finally, Chapter V concludes the writing in
a synthesis of the case studies and the primary research.
The findings of the research concluded that affordable
housing development in California does represent an
opportunity for the for-profit developer. However, succeeding
in this arena involves in depth knowledge of an institutional
framework quite different from that within which traditional
market-rate development is practiced. The research concludes
that local political support is the element most critical in
working a project through this institutional maze. To acquire
this support, it is crucial to select sites offering large-
scale, mixed-income potential within a community which has
adopted and carries out pro-active affordable housing policy.
Further, within the current political environment, to gain
local public appeal and access to essential subsidies, it is
vital that the for-profit developer enter joint-venture
arrangements with a public or private non-profit entity.
Thesis Supervisor: Langley Keyes, Professor of City Planning
Department of Urban Planning
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INTRODUCTION
Thesis Intent
The purpose of this research was to determine the
prospect for the involvement of the for-profit developer in
affordable- family housing in California, where insatiable
demand for quality affordable housing has translated into a
supply deficit beyond the production capacity of the current
public and non-profit effort. At the same time, California's
for-profit development industry is operating far below
capacity as a result of the enduring national recession, local
over-supply of most commercial product types, and the
continuation of a national real estate credit crunch. This
paper examines the role of the for-profit developer under
these current conditions, subsequent to the HUD scandals of
the 1980's which, in combination with difficult fiscal times,
have resulted in significant cutbacks in the once noteworthy
pool of federal subsidies:
Description of Research
A majority of the research was conducted in interviews
with individuals connected to the affordable housing industry
through both private and public channels. These interviews
included several for-profit development firms of varying
sizes, geographic concentrations, and historical focus, as
well as Bridge Housing Corporation, a non-community based non-
profit housing development firm. Discussions were held with
housing specialists from various local governmental agencies
as well as from the State government. Finally, interviews were
held with lenders actively involved in affordable housing.
Thesis Organization
Though housing policy has significant influence on
determining the feasibility of the for-profit firm's
involvement in affordable housing development, the research is
presented from the perspective of the developer, primarily in
terms of its strategic options, rather than as a review and
assessment of national policy. Chapter I briefly describes the
magnitude of the need for affordable housing product in
California and its resulting consequences on the State's
livelihood. Most of this chapter is dedicated to discussing
the complex institutional framework within which the developer
must operate to successfully build affordable housing.
Chapters II, III, and IV are written around the central theme
of the research; the role of the for-profit developer in
affordable housing. Here, three case studies are presented
which involve mixed-income affordable housing projects
currently in planning or under construction. The first study
involves a suburban rental project in Orange County, sponsored
by a joint-venture of private for-profit and non-profit firms.
The second study involves a similar joint-venture in the
development of a mixed-income single-family home and multi-
family rental development on the fringe of San Jose. The third
study involves the replacement of an urban public housing
project by a for-profit firm under a development agreement
with the City of Los Angeles. Chapter V, the conclusion
presents a synthesis of the case studies and the primary
research in the form of a strategy outline. Here, the role of,
as well as the prospect for, the California for-profit-
developer in the affordable housing sector is clearly defined.
CHAPTER ONE
WORKING THROUGH THE INSTITUTIONAL MAZE
The Need
California has among the most serious housing problems in
the country. For more than a decade, a failure to produce an
adequate supply of housing at affordable prices has left the
State with homeownership costs almost twice the national
average and rental costs among the highest in the nation.
According to the State Department of Housing and Community
Development (HCD) , to accommodate the projected growth for the
1990's, California will need approximately 300,000 new housing
units per year. Of this, 40% (120,000 units per year) should
be affordable to low-income households (i.e. those earning
less than 80% of the median income of the area in which they
live). During the last decade, an annual average of 210,000
housing units were built statewide; and best estimates show
that less than a quarter of those homes were affordable to
lower income households.1
According to HCD, in addition to the current requirement
for new housing, current residents also have pressing housing
needs. In 1990, less than one in ten renters could afford to
buy a new home, and over two million lower-income households
were spending more than a third of their income on housing. In
addition, 19.6% of the renters in California were living in
overcrowded conditions, a measure of housing inadequacy which
has doubled since 1980, after several decades of decline.
Finally, 1.37 million houses or apartments (13% of all housing
units) in California need rehabilitation or replacement.2
This affordability crisis no longer impacts just the very
poor. It is now an acute problem for most of the workforce.
The problem confronts teachers, police officers, firefighters,
nurses, commercial and industrial workers, entry-level
professionals. It is a problem of both the young and the old.
Furthermore, it is even a problem of for the relatively
affluent middle-aged homeowners, who often must confront both
the housing needs of their grown children as they form new
families, and of their elderly parents who are trapped on
fixed incomes.3
Businesses, as well as consumers, suffer from the
scarcity of reasonably priced homes. As households migrate
away from California to regions with more affordable housing,
the competition for qualified employees increases, as well as
the pressure to raise salaries to accommodate housing costs,
and to compensate for long, costly, and often fatiguing
commutes. Employee turnover and dissatisfaction increase, and
labor efficiency decreases. Gridlocked freeways in southern
California and in the Bay Area are clogged with frustrated and
angry long-distance commuters, who are wasting gasoline,
polluting and degrading air quality, and demanding huge
investments of investments of public and private funds in new
highways, transit systems, and parking facilities. In a
vicious cycle, many of these same people believe that only and
end to job growth and a moratorium on new housing can solve
the problem, resulting a more difficult setting in which to
develop affordable housing.4
Carrots and Sticks
As evidenced above, the housing crisis in California is
now a concern of all factions of the population. At the same
time, the most severe real estate credit-crisis since the
Great Depression is taking place. Moreover, federal support of
affordable-housing is at its lowest level in decades-HUD's
budget is 20% of what it was twelve years ago5 . As a result
of these phenomena, housing policy at the State level is
receiving increasingly more attention. That policy is carried
out through a complicated system involving the use of the
state's zoning enabling powers, the administration of the
remaining federal subsidy programs, and the implementation of
state-level subsidy and incentive programs. This system in
place and growing in complexity, in combination with what is
currently a demanding lending environment, produces a complex
maze through which a real estate developer must maneuver to
successfully develop affordable housing. The following is a
description of this "carrot and stick" framework from the
10
perspective of the private real estate developer. First is a
summary of pertinent State legislation. Second, a synopsis of
the current real estate lending environment. Finally, an
outline of relevant subsidies available at all levels of
government.
I. State Housing Legislation
State Housing Element Law:
To ensure that all levels of government adequately
respond to these serious needs, state law (adopted 1980)
requires each city and county to adopt a "housing element" as
part of its general plan. A general plan must contain at least
seven elements relating to; land use, circulation,
conservation, open space, noise, safety, and housing. Of the
seven, only the housing element is subject to mandatory review
by a state entity; HCD.6
Definition:
As required by the state, "the housing element shall
consist of an identification and analysis of existing and
projected housing needs and a statement of goals, policies,
quantified objectives, and scheduled programs for the
preservation, improvement and development of housing. The
housing element shall identify adequate sites for housing, and
shall make adequate provision for the existing and projected
needs of all economic segments of the community."7
Compliance:
Despite legislative direction to local governments and
technical assistance provided by HCD, most cities and counties
in California do not have a housing element in compliance with
State law. Of 509 cities in California required to have
housing elements, as of December 31, 1991, 107 (21%) had
adopted elements which HCD found to be in substantial
compliance.8
However, in the last few years, the number of housing
elements reviewed by HCD has increased dramatically. For
example, in 1988 HCD reviewed a total of 80 elements, 203 in
1989, and 286 in 1991.9 In fact, as of this writing (July,
1992), it is estimated that over 30% of all municipalities
have adopted state approved elements. This expression of
increased local attention to housing issues appears to reflect
the seriousness of California's housing problems, changes in
housing element law, increased advocacy and litigation on
housing element issues-as the federal role in housing policy
diminishes, and/or municipalities' compliance with their
Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy (CHAS) to gain
access to federal CDBG and HOME funds.10
State Law in Response to Non-Compliance:
This failure of cities and counties to articulate and
carry out housing policy seriously hinders the development of
needed housing in California. In 1990, the State Legislature
12
recognized the situation in passing anti-exclusionary zoning
laws.
Essentially, this law prohibits local agencies from
disapproving low- and moderate-income1 housing developments,
or from conditioning project approval in a manner which would
make projects infeasible for development, unless certain
findings are made.
If the locality's adopted housing element is not in
compliance with state law, then development can, under certain
circumstances, override local zoning. If such a project is
denied approval, or restrictions are placed on it which
adversely affect its viability or affordablity, and the
decision is challenged in a court action, the burden of proof
is placed on the locality that the decision is consistent with
the findings. This law however, has not had wide spread
application.12
Housing Element Litigation:
A locality's non-compliance with housing element law
renders its general plan inadequate and leaves the locality
exposed to legal challenges which could limit its ability to
issue building permits, institute zoning changes, establish a
redevelopment project area, or carry out other general
policies. Increasingly, housing advocates and neighborhood
groups have successfully used housing element litigation to
13
have plans, programs, and even housing projects stalled or
stopped. 13
Litigation by private parties or the Attorney General's
Office is the only available enforcement mechanism for housing
element law. However, such an implementation is costly. Direct
incentives for local governments' compliance is limited to
state administered CDBG funds (which only applies those cities
with populations of under 50,000). Aside from those mentioned
above, there are no serious sanctions for those who do not
comply. 14
Regional Share:
Housing Element Law statutorily mandates councils of
governments (COG's), or in areas without COG's, HCD, to
prepare regional housing needs plans (RHNP's) for the
localities within the region. These regional plans provide
cities and counties with a measure of their share of a
region's projected need by household income group over the
approximately five-year planning period of the housing
element. 15
COG's are voluntary agencies which carry out a broad
range of regional planning programs, including housing. A
COG's jurisdiction can range from part of a county to multi-
county. Given their regional perspective, COG's are well
suited for preparing fair growth allocation plans. However,
they must rely on the cooperation of the municipalities for
14
the acceptance and implementation of their plans.16
Localities are required to provide for their share of the
regional housing need within their housing elements. The
numerous localities which lack proactive housing policy often
rely on this allocation as the core of their housing elements.
State Density Bonus Law:
Adopted in 1980 and modified in 1989, to make affordable
housing development more feasible, the Density Bonus Law
requires all cities and counties to adopt ordinances which
entitle qualified mixed-income housing projects to density
bonuses. As of 1990, housing projects of 5 units or more in
which for a period of at least 10 years, a minimum of 20% of
the units are set aside for low-income households, 10% for
very-low income17 households, or 50% of the units for certain
classifications of senior citizens, qualify for a bonus of 25%
of the maximum density per the existing zoning. In lieu of the
increased density, the municipality may provide the developer
with direct financial assistance, fee waivers, or other means
of compensation in amounts equivalent to the forsaken benefits
attributable to the hypothetical density bonus.
18  19
Calculating the exact compensation can be a complex process,
as it involves mutual agreement of extensive site-planning and
financial analysis.20 A developer which agrees to restrict
rents for a 30 year period is entitled to the density bonus
and additional concessions such as reducing site development
15
standards or design requirements.21
Enforcement of the provisions of the law is subject to
the courts. In all cases, by law, the developer carries the
difficult burden of establishing the need for the bonus. 22
Prior to an amendment to the law in 1989, the bonus was
aimed at the low- and moderate-. income segments. Although
adoption was not required, at least 20 jurisdictions utilized
the system, typically in conjunction with 80%-20% bond
issues. Subsequent to 1989, there has been a significant
increase in the number of municipalities adopting density
bonus/inclusionary zoning ordinances. However, actual
development activity under the amended bonus law has been
limited, likely due to the ongoing recession and the newly
imposed rent restrictions which target the very low- and low-
income population segments..24
II. Real Estate Lending Environment
The following discussion summarizes the status of the
real estate lending markets from the perspective of the
affordable housing developer. As maintained throughout the
thesis, access to capital is the most critical element of a
successful development.
The Real Estate Credit Crunch:
The real estate "boom" turn bust of the past decade has
resulted in substantial financial damage to the lending
industry. Various analysts say banks and thrifts could lose as
much as 20% of the value of their real estate portfolios, and
therefore, almost half of their net-worths. As a result, those
lending institutions (banks and insurance companies included)
involved in real estate have received increasingly more
skepticism from Wall street, where real estate is
categorically perceived as a risky business.25 In addition,
several federal regulations were adopted in 1989 under the
Financial Institutions Reform and Recovery Enforcement Act
(FIRREA) , primarily in response to the S&L crises of the late
1980's. FIRREA entailed several regulations including more
stringent guidelines on real estate underwriting, loan audits,
and loan loss-reserve requirements.26 27 The Act also removed
thrifts from development lending. Though a minority of lenders
continue to solicit real estate business, in general, most
have significantly decreased their real estate lending
activity in response to the pressure from Wall Street and
exhausting demands of federal regulators.28
Pressure on the Financing Side - The CRA:
Despite the pressure to stay away from real estate
lending, certain commercial banks and thrifts (savings banks,
S&L's, and credit unions) are motivated by the CRA regulations
to be actively involved in financing low- and moderate-income
housing.
The CRA of 1977 affirmed the concept that banks and
17
thrifts, as publicly chartered institutions, have a continuing
obligation to help meet the credit needs of the communities in
which they do business. In particular, CRA asks lending
institutions to actively make efforts to serve low- and
moderate-income hbuseholds in their service areas, which
includes extending credit for affordable housing.9
Incentive to Respond to CRA:
As of 1989, federal agencies are required to assess CRA
records in evaluating applications involving branch
transactions as well as mergers and acquisitions made by
lending institutions.30 With the growth of interstate banking
and the rise of mergers and consolidations in the 1990's,
community reinvestment performance is becoming increasingly
important. 3 1 However, as long as lenders are pressured to
stay out of real estate credit, it appears that in general,
considerable CRA-related real estate lending will be limited
to those institutions actively involved in mergers or
acquisitions.
Affordable Housing Lending Consortiums:
Many larger institutions as well as community banks in
California are internally staffed to underwrite loans for
affordable-housing developments. In addition, two consortiums
of lenders in California; SAMCO and CCRC, operate as mortgage
banking entities to allow thrifts and banks respectively, to
outsource a portion of their community reinvestment lending.
These organizations are familiar with the complexity of
affordable housing projects and allow member institutions to
pool the risk (real or perceived) of affordable housing loans,
reducing the exposure of any one institution32 .
Savings Association Mortgage Company (SAMCO):
SAMCO is a mortgage banking organization which pools
funds from its California savings and loan member institutions
and provides permanent financing for low-income housing.
Although SAMCO was founded prior to the CRA, its membership
has increased dramatically since 1989 due to the lending
industry's need to respond to the regulations set out by
FIRREA.
In 1991 SAMCO wrote loan commitments for 1, 329 units
totaling $37.7 million. Approximately 25% of these commitments
were made to projects sponsored by for-profit owners. SAMCO
requires 51% of a project's units to be set-aside for
households earning 80% or less of area median income. Loan
terms are 30 years with a maximum of 75% loan-to-value.
SAMCO's interest rates, competitive with the "market", are set
at the time of funding. Responding to strong borrower demand,
SAMCO is currently engaged in the formation of a secondary
market for portions of its loan portfolio.33
19
California Community Reinvestment Corporation (CCRC):
The CCRC was created in 1989 to provide California banks
with a vehicle to serve the affordable housing market. Forty-
six banks provide the consortium with a total pool of over
$100 million to make permanent loans for new construction or
substantial renovation.34
CCRC requires minimum affordability set-asides of 20% of
a project's units for households earning 50% or below area
median income, 40% for households earning 60% or below, or 51%
of the units reserved for households earning 80% or below the
area median income. Loan terms are 10, 15, or 30 years with
competitive interest rates.35
III. Subsidies
The following is a summary of those federal, State, and
local subsidy programs most often utilized in the development
of affordable family housing by for-profit developers.
Subsidies Administered at the State Level:
Low Income Housing Tax Credits (Rental Property):
In December of 1991, the US Congress extended the Low-
Income Tax Credit Program (LIHTC) for an additional six
months, requiring a "final" allocation by June 30, 1992. As
has been the case over the course of the program, in fiscal
1991-1992, the State of California allocated 100% of its
federal credits, $37.875 million ($1.25 per capita).
20
Additionally, the State allocated $35 million of its state
credits. As of this writing, the House of Representatives has
passed an urban-aid bill which will include an extension of
the LIHTC. The Senate is expected to approve the same
shortly. 3
The applicable credit rate for new construction is 9% per
year (of qualified basis) for 10 years for projects without
tax exempt bond financing, and 4% per year for those with tax
exempt financing. Credits can be used by the owner or sold up-
front with the proceeds of the sale used toward project
equity. On a sale basis, tax credits typically generate $.50
in equity for every $1.00 in credits.37
Sponsors of 100% restricted projects can expect to
finance 40%-50% of development costs by selling 9% credits.
IRS regulations limit front-end developer fees to 15% of the
project's depreciable basis, 10% for those projects utilizing
HUD assistance. 8
The California State Credit Allocation Committee, the
state agency responsible for administering the LIHTC program,
was able to give credit reservations to 86 of 152 applicants
in the June, 1992 allocation. Approximately 30 of the 152
applications were deemed ineligible or incomplete.
Historically, about 1/3 of the applicants have received
reservations. over the past few years, the reservations have
been granted approximately 50% to for-profit, and 50% to non-
profit sponsors.39
Qualifying projects must set aside a minimum of 20% of
the project's units for households earning 50% or less than
area median income, or 40% of the units for households earning
60% or less of median income. (The actual low-income set-aside
ratio is applied to qualifying project costs to determine the
"qualified basis" from which the 9% and 4% credit calculations
are generated). Rent and utility payments for these tenants
are limited to 30% of tenant's gross income. In addition, all
applications are required to meet five basic requirements: (1)
a demonstrated "housing need" in the local area - i.e., as
evidenced by the CHAS study, (2) demonstrated site control (3)
enforceable permanent or construction financing commitments
for at least 50% of the project's total estimated need, (4)
local zoning approvals (a variance or CUP may be in process) ,
and (5) sponsor development and management experience.
Projects being financed with tax-exempt bonds
automatically receive a federal-credit reservation upon
satisfying the five basic threshold requirements (if evidence
of a bond allocation is produced in lieu of No. 3 above). All
other projects, including tax-exempt bond projects, applying
for state-credits are subject to a competitive ranking system.
This system gives preference to projects serving residents
with the lowest incomes, to projects serving qualified
residents for the longest time period (30-55 years), and to
those projects where local agencies or the project owner makes
significant financial contributions (minimum of 15% and 30%
22
respectively) to the project. With fierce competition for the
credits in California, most projects which receive credit
reservations have nearly perfect profiles in terms of the
ranking criteria. 40
California Rental Housing Construction Program (RHCP):
In a response to cutbacks in Federal subsidies, in 1988,
California voters approved initiatives for the issue of $550
million in general obligation bonds to provide financing for
the construction and rehabilitation of rental housing for the
very-low income. The last of these funds was allocated in June
of 1992. Although an additional issue is being proposed in the
State Senate, the fiscal problems in California may prevent an
extension of this program any time soon.41
Funds are eligible for any costs associated with project
development. The loan term is 40 years at a rate of 3% simple
interest. Payments may be deferred for the economic
feasibility of the project. Principle and interest is due 30
years from funding. Under the RHCP, for a term of 40 years, at
least 30% of all units must be held affordable42 to low- and
very-low income persons and at least two thirds of assisted
units set-aside for very-low income persons.43
The competition for these funds has been fierce. In a
typical round of funding, approximately 25% of applicants have
received allocations. Projects are ranked in a competitive
system with preference given to those containing more family
23
(three- and four- bedroom) units and a high level of municipal
involvement. In terms of the funding record, non-profit
sponsors have received the majority of the allocations."
Tax-Exempt Mortgage Revenue Bond Financing:
Tax exempt bond financing is administered by the
California Debt Limit Allocation Committee. This department
receives an annual "state ceiling" from the federal government
on "private activity bonds". Private activity bonds are issued
for a variety of public purposes, including construction and
permanent financing for multi-family rental housing. In 1992
it is anticipated that only $48.9 million, or 6% of a total
State ceiling of $786 million will be committed for multi-
family housing production, as compared to $272 million (19%)
in 1991 and $163 million (11%) in 1990.45 During the last few
years, all residential development bond financing requests
have been addressed. 46
In most cases, the local government having jurisdiction
over the project combines efforts with the project sponsor, on
a project to project basis, to apply to the State for an
allocation. Once approved, the municipality issues the bonds
at the local level. In terms of project criteria, a minimum of
20% of a project's units must be set aside and restricted for
households earning less than 50% of area median income. In
those years when bond requests exceed the State allocation,
projects are ranked in terms of their affordability
24
characteristics and term, the sponsor's financial stake in the
project, and the needs of the project's locale.47
As a result of the tax-exempt status of the bonds, fixed
interest rates are generally at least 2% below conventional
mortgage rates. "Lower floater" bonds, bearing variable
interest rates which adjust on a weekly basis, are more
popular in the current credit climate with rates varying in
the 1.5% to 2.5% range. Sponsors typically have the option to
change these to fixed rate obligations on a bi-annual or
annual basis. Most bond issues are for 10-15 year terms. The
costs associated with issuing bonds make it economically
unfeasible to use this type of financing for small
projects.4
Before the bonds can be sold to investors and prior to
the approving government agency finalizing the allocation, the
bonds must have credit enhancement to provide them with a
rating required by the syndicator. Credit enhancement is
achieved through the issuance of a stand-by letter of credit
from a commercial bank, third party mortgage insurance, surety
bonds, or other third party guarantees49.
Credit enhancement has become the most difficult element
of bond financing. HUD does not have a program to insure
variable rate bonds, currently the most economically
attractive. Pension funds are concerned with the IRS issue of
Unrelated Business Income.50 Consequently, banks remain a
primary source of credit enhancement. However, it has become
25
increasingly more difficult to attract interest in this area:
FIRREA calls for banks to account for LOC's in their balance
sheets and therefore, to set-aside capital reserves for LOC's.
Prior to 1989, LOC's were essentially underwritten as off-
balance sheet assets. 51 Additionally, letters of credit do
not present banks with CRA credits as clearly defined as
within the context of strait construction or permanent
loans. 52 Finally, as with strait mortgages, as a result of
the standards imposed by FIRREA, banks have had to become more
conservative in underwriting real estate related LOC's.
Subsidies Administered at the Local Level:
Sources of Local Funds: California municipalities access
housing funds through several sources. A limited amount of
federal HUD funds are allocated to cities and counties
directly as well as through the State HCD. These include
Community Development Block Grants (CDBG's), Section-8 rental
subsidies, and funds through the new HOME program.
Larger pools of funds are raised locally through tax
increments from redevelopment districts. Cities with
redevelopment areas are allowed to "freeze" the tax-base of
these areas and collect any subsequent increase in property
taxes that result from development activity. State law, which
has recently become more stringent, calls for cities to use a
minimum of 20% of their tax increment funds to promote
affordable housing. A city which fails to do so within a five
year period, by law, is required to relinquish such funds to
its County, which in turn, distributes the funds to other
cities.53
Other sources of local funds include operating surpluses
of redevelopment agencies and housing authorities, hotel-tax
and commercial development linkage programs, grants, and bond
issuance fees54  .
Uses of Local Funds: Because municipalities are given
freedom in terms of developing housing policy development to
meet the needs of their locale, locally administered subsidy
programs tend to vary in terms of project restrictions and
application processes. Depending upon the city or county in
question, housing programs are administered through the
Housing Authority/Commission or Redevelopment Agency; both in
the case of most larger cities. The following describes
commonly found local programs targeted to family affordable-
housing projects.
Acquisition Financing:
Local funds are often made available to provide for-
profit and non-profit sponsors with funding necessary to
purchase sites and prepare plans for affordable housing
development. These funds typically take the legal form of
subordinated, non-recourse mortgages. In actuality, to allow
for maximum leverage, the residual character of their
repayment obligations result in these funds appearing more as
equity than debt.s6
Construction Financing:
In addition to tax-exempt bond financing, which will
typically absorb nearly all of a project's debt capacity,
local funds are often available in smaller increments to fill
the gap between the total project cost and its primary source
of debt and investors' equity. These funds are also termed as
subordinated debt and offer highly discounted interest rates
and lenient repayment terms.
Single-Family Home-Purchaser Subsidies:
Local funds are often committed to a single-family home
project to be used to subsidize first-time moderate-income
home purchasers.
These funds are used to provide qualified purchasers with
grants toward down-payments or "silent" second-mortgages.
Grants are typically in the area of 2% of the total purchase
price-40% of a down payment. Second mortgages range in the
area of 5%-20% of purchase price. These loans typically carry
no debt-service requirements and are repaid only upon the
borrower selling the home within a specified time period.
Cities also issue tax-exempt bonds to fund first-time
homebuyers with discounted interest rates.57
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Municipal Development Fee Reductions and Density Bonuses:
In response to cutbacks in federal housing subsidies,
many cities are beginning to provide incentives for affordable
housing development through the waiving of certain development
fees and offering of density bonuses.58 The City of San Diego
for example, is in the process of developing an inclusionary
zoning ordinance which will provide qualified projects with
density bonuses, deferral of certain City Fees, narrower
street-width, and smaller parking-stall size requirements in
an effort to lower development costs.59
CHAPTER TWO
SAN RAFAEL APARTMENT HOMES
A PROJECT STUDY OF A MIXED-INCOME MULTI-FAMILY RENTAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRVINE COMPANY & BRIDGE HOUSING
The information presented in the following case study was
obtained through interviews and written information provided
by Raymond Watson, Vice Chairman, The Irvine Company and
Richard Lamprecht, Vice President-Development, Irvine
Pacific, Newport Beach, California.
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SAN RAFAEL APARTMENT HOMES
General Description
Despite a massive slump in the area's real estate market,
construction began in May of 1992 on a 15.1 acre site for
Orange County's first new low-income rental housing project
since 1989. San Rafael is being developed by a partnership
consisting of the Irvine Company and Bridge Housing
Corporation, a San Francisco based non-profit housing
developer. The project reaches new ground in that it is both
the Irvine Co. 's first joint-venture with a non-profit
development firm and Bridge's first venture outside of the Bay
Area.
Scheduled for completion in April of 1993 at an estimated
total cost of $41.3 million, San Rafael will provide 134 units
to very low-income households, 20 units to low-income
households, 30 units to moderate-income households and 198
units at market-rates. The majority of the project's financing
will come from a tax-exempt mortgage revenue bond issue
approved by the Irvine City Council in the summer of 1991.
Site Location
San Rafael is located within the 833-acre planned
suburban community of Westpark-Irvine's newest residential
village and is bordered by Harvard Avenue to the north, San
Juan to the east and San Leon to the southwest. The site is
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conveniently located near the San Diego Freeway (1-405) and
Santa Ana Freeway (1-5), offering convenient access to many
employment areas throughout Orange County. Shopping centers,
entertainment, restaurants, the University of California,
Irvine, and recreational facilities are in close proximity to
the project.
Project Program
Upon completion, the project will consist of 28 two- and
three- story wood frame and stucco buildings containing 382
apartment units at a density of 25 units per acre. Ten floor
plans will range in size from 660 square feet one-bedroom
flats to 1,365 square feet three-bedroom townhomes:
# BR's Type Sa. Ft. # Units Mix
1 Flat 660 44 11%
1 Flat 690 84 22%
2 Flat 1,040 24 6%
2 Flat 1,020 22 6%
2 Flat 1,090 48 13%
2 Flat 1,100 24 6%
2 TH 1,180 38 10%.
2 TH 1,155 38 10%
3 TH 1,315 30 8%
3 TH 1,365 30 8%
Totals 382
Project amenities will include washer/dryer furnished in
66% of all units, on-site laundry facility, two large heated
swimming pools, two outdoor whirlpool spas, garages, fitness
center, and large tot lot play area.
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Political Context
As most of the state, Orange County experienced
significant economic growth during the mid and late 1980's.
The city of Irvine in particular, in combining efforts with
the Irvine Co. and the business community, was successful in
attracting a substantial employment base during this time
period. Residential development also occurred at a relatively
slower pace. This phenomenon was due in part to local
politics.
Throughout most of the.1980's, until the local election
of 1990, a majority of City Council, including Mayor Larry
Agran, vocally supported a slow-growth movement on new
development, while silently supporting job growth. The result
has been a growing disparity between jobs and population,
approximately 150,000:110,000 as of this writing. With demand
far outweighing the supply of housing, prices and rents have
been driven up to levels far out of the affordability range of
thousands of Irvine workers. Median apartment rents and
single-family home prices in Irvine are approximately $900-
$1,050 per month and $250,000, respectively.
In 1989 the City of Irvine's housing element was due for
revision as required every five years by the State. During
this same time period, the City was also receiving criticism
from the Southern California Council of Governments for its
failure to provide its allocated regional share of affordable
housing. Agran's group pushed for what the Irvine Co. argued
were dramatic, and economically unfeasible housing policy
goals. This group pressed for the majority of 25% of the
city's housing stock to be affordable to very low-income
households, including the adoption of a rigid inclusionary
zoning ordinance. According to the Irvine Co., almost all of
the city's rental housing stock would require heavy subsidies.
Although the Irvine Co. was intent on providing
affordable elements to its upcoming projects, management knew
Agran's "goal" to be unrealistic from a financial perspective
and rallied support from the Chamber of Commerce and the BIA
to argue for its cause. Agran's group responded by denouncing
the Irvine Co. for "opposing low-income housing".
With the election of a new mayor to office, the political
climate switched directions in the midst of the debates.
Consequently, City Council adopted a housing element with less
stringent objectives. The new element calls for 1% of the
city's housing stock to be affordable to households earning
30% or less than the county's median income (currently
$52,200), 11.5% to those earning 50% or less, and 12%
affordable to those earning 80% or less of area median income.
Additionally, a flexible inclusionary zoning ordinance was put
in place as part of the housing policy.
Motivation to Develop Affordable Housing
The Irvine Co. views San Rafael not only as response to
the demands of local government and capital market conditions,
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but also as a profitable means to continue developing a
balanced portfolio of housing.
As discussed, in an effort to meet the goals of its
housing element, the City of Irvine is conditioning zoning
approvals on inclusionary provisions for affordable housing.
By restricting a greater number of units for very low-income
households within San Rafael than required by the City, the
Irvine Co. receives "credits" for inclusionary requirements,
transferable to other sites within Westpark. Satisfying these
requirements for other sites will enable the Irvine Co. to
either sell or develop these parcels more profitably when
market-rate development becomes more viable.
The state of the real estate and banking industry has
resulted in most lenders being reluctant to underwrite any new
development loans for commercial or market-rate residential
projects. As is the case with San Rafael, the Irvine Co.
believes lenders are somewhat less reluctant to extend credit
(in this case credit-enhancement) to affordable housing
projects, where market risk is relatively low.
Third, Donald Bren, Chairman of the Irvine Co., strongly
supports the continued development of multi-family rental
product for the company's portfolio. The availability of
favorable tax-exempt bond financing combined with financial
subsidies for San Rafael result in a yield competitive with
that which could be achieved through developing a 100% market-
rate project with conventional financing. The insatiable
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demand for the restricted units significantly lowers the
project's market-risk, resulting in a relatively attractive
risk-adjusted rate of return.
Finally, of 10,000 apartments in the Irvine Co.'s
portfolio, 2,500 are affordable-subsidized under Section-8 or
other bond programs. Ray Watson, Vice-Chairman of the Irvine
Co., is in favor of continuing to show his and the Irvine
Co. 's commitment to providing a balanced housing stock.
Decision to Joint-Venture with Bridge Housing
Although the Irvine Co. has developed and owns a
significant number of subsidized rental units independently,
the status of the local political situation and Bridge's
successful track-record of accessing scarce subsidies led to
the decision to bring Bridge into a partnership.
Though the housing element was adopted prior to
negotiating zoning approvals for the subject site, the Irvine
Co. judged Bridge's involvement in the development to increase
its credibility in dealing with the local agencies for project
entitlements.
In terms of citizen opposition from "Not in My Backyard"
(NIMBY) factions, the Irvine Co. had previously established a
successful track record of developing subsidized housing
within the context of the community. However, Bridge's
experience in dealing with a wide variety of citizen groups
could only be of benefit in the event of citizen opposition.
In terms of financing, the local, state and federal subsidies
are becoming more scarce during the current depressed economic
and fiscal times. The Irvine Co. believed non-profit
participation within the partnership would allow it greater
access to funds such as Community Development Block Grants and
subsidized loans from the Orange County Housing Authority.
Land Lease
The Irvine Co. leased the 15.1 acre site to the joint-
venture partnership (described below) for 35 years on a
subordinated basis. As consideration, it will receive annual
payments from excess cash flow in an amount equal to 8% of the
current land value of $9.5 million. Lease payments accrue in
the event cash flow is insufficient to satisfy the obligation.
By leasing the site to the partnership, the Irvine Co.
avoids property tax reassessment of a sale, avoids sharing
appreciation with outside-equity partners (which have not been
involved in the project to date) , and avoids extra legal work
involved in structuring an option and sale transaction.
Partnership Structure
As mentioned, the partnership represents Bridge's first
direct involvement outside the northern California market and
the Irvine Co. 's first joint-venture with a non-profit
developer. The two parties began discussions in late 1989 and
came to a mutual agreement of the partnership structure in the
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summer of 1990. As described below, Bridge essentially plays
the role of a consultant to assist the Irvine Co. with the
public approvals and financing. The following summarizes the
agreement:
Within the partnership, the Irvine Co. is responsible for
day-to-day project planning and management duties. Its legal
capacity is that of co-general partner (1% ownership interest)
and sole limited partner (98% ownership interest). In addition
to managing the project, the Irvine Co. pledges its fee title
to the land as collateral for the bond financing and provides
all required equity capital. In return, it receives tax-credit
and depreciation benefits and any residual cash flow after
debt-service in the form of ground-lease payments.
As discussed above, the Irvine Co's. primary motivation
in approaching Bridge was to gain from the non-profit's
political appeal and its accessibility to subsidies.
Consequently, Bridge's responsibilities as "managing general
partner"6 (1% ownership interest) lay in the areas of public
approval processing and obtaining funding. Bridge' may also
play a part in the management of the property upon completion
of construction. In essence, Bridge takes the role of a
consultant. In return for its involvement in the pre-
development phase, Bridge will receive a developer' fee in
the amount of $300,000.
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Entitlements
As discussed, the subject site is one of the last few
remaining parcels available for development in Westpark.
Originally, the 15.1 acre site had been subdivided into three
parcels, two commercially and one residentially zoned. In
December of 1990, after completing Environmental Impact
Reports (EIR's) and negotiating with the Planning Commission
and City Council, the Irvine Co. received zoning approvals on
all remaining parcels within Westpark. This "master" zoning
approval included a flexible inclusionary requirement for
affordable housing, which allows for the transfer of
inclusionary credits. The Irvine Co. negotiated this zoning
with the intention of fulfilling all of the lower-income
requirements on the San Rafael site to allow for maximum
flexibility in developing or selling the other Westpark
parcels.
A site plan for San Rafael was developed with McLarand,
Vasquez and Partners Architects and submitted for a
Conditional Use Permit (a site plan approval) under the
Bridge/Irvine Co. partnership in January of 1991. The as-of-
right zoning for this particular site allowed for up to 31
units per acre without a density bonus. However, an overall
allowable maximum density for Westpark, negotiated prior to
the submittal of the site plan, precluded the Irvine Co. from
attaining more than the 25 units per acre currently under
construction.61
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Aside from typical site-planning issues, the negotiation
between the partnership and the Planning Commission was
focused on defining the magnitude of the affordable element
which would satisfy requirements for all remaining residential
sites in Westpark. Although the baseline calculations were
broadly determined during the prior zoning negotiations,
according to the new housing element, the actual City-required
affordable housing mix depends upon the amount of financial
subsidies a project ultimately receives. Consequently, the
negotiations focused on defining the logistics of this
complicated process. The Partnership obtained a CUP in June of
1991 from the Planning Commission. The final affordability
restrictions were determined several months later, after all
subsidies were obtained.
Development Budget
Hard Construction Costs
Common Area
Direct-Sitework
Direct-Buildings
Total Hard Costs
Soft Construction Costs
Indirect-Buildings
Indirect-Sitework
Marketing
Finance
Developer Fee-Bridge
Developer Fee-Contractor
Total Soft Costs
Contingency (3%)
Total Project Cost
Total Cost per Sq. Ft.
$ 2,140,000
1,057,000
18,487,000
$22,484,000
$ 2,728,000
1,515,000
350,000
2,470,000
300,000
515,000
$ 7,878,000
929,000
$31,291,000
$80.88
Financing Program
Summary of Sources:
(1) Tax-Exempt Mortgage Revenue Bonds (Debt)
(2) Orange County Housing Authority (Debt)
(3) City of Irvine CD Block Grant (Debt)
(4) Irvine Co. Tax Credit Purchase (Equity)
(5) Land at Market Value (Equity)
Total Capital
$28,000,000
1,350,000
700,000
1,750,000
9,550,000
$40,350,000
(1) Tax-Exempt Bond Financing:
$28 million, 12 year term, 1st year "lower floater"
status, years 2 - 12 fixed at 7.5% interest, credit enhanced
by Sumitomo Bank, 1% origination fee, .075% annual guarantee
fee.
In an effort to support the drive for affordable housing,
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the City Council approved a $28 million tax-exempt bond issue
one month after the project received a CUP. The approval was
expected as a result of informal discussions which had
occurred with the City during project planning. However, to
vote on the issue, the City Council required that all non-
administrative land-use approvals be in place. With the bond
issue approved, the condition of the real estate lending
market resulted in the Partnership requiring several months to
obtain a commitment to provide credit-enhancement. After six
months, the Partnership received a commitment from Sumitomo
Bank to provide a letter of credit. This would be Sumitomo's
first involvement in the affordable housing market. One of the
few remaining banks with a high credit rating, Sumitomo was
attracted to the project as an onslaught to providing
assessment-district financing to the Irvine Co.. The Irvine
Co. agreed to pledge its fee interest in the land, valued at
approximately $9.5 million, as additional collateral. Sumitomo
conditioned its commitment on the provision that all other
capital sources be committed to the project.
To gain federal tax-exempt eligibility, the Partnership
was required to set aside at least 20% of the units (77) for
households earning 50% of area median income or less, for a
term of 10 years. In setting aside 35% (143) of the units for
very low-income households, the eligibility requirement was
satisfied.
(2) Orange County Housing Authority Development Loan:
$1.35 million, 20 year term, 4% fixed interest rate,
interest payments deferred years 1-3, principle payments
deferred years 1-7.
The Orange County Housing Authority accessed surplus
funds from its operating reserve to provide this construction
and permanent loan. The processing time of approximately eight
months ran concurrent with project approvals. The Authority's
allocation was not contingent on other financing commitments.
Additionally, it did not impose specific affordability
restrictions on the project, but relied on those required to
obtain tax-exempt bonds and low-income tax credit allocations.
(3) City of Irvine - Community Development Block Grant:
$700,000, 10 year term, 3% interest rate, principal and
interest payments deferred years 1-5.
Although these federal funds are very scarce nationally,
the City of Irvine was in a unique position of needing to seek
out eligible project sponsors in order to allocate its share
of the block grant funds. As a result, the Partnership was
able to obtain the block-grant commitment upon receiving
project approvals. The processing time was under six months
and also ran concurrent with project approvals. The city of
Irvine depended upon the affordability restrictions set forth
in the bond financing and low-income tax credit allocation
guidelines.
(4) Federal Low-Income Tax Credit Allocation:
$625,000 annual credits for 10 years, based on 4% of
approximately $15 million in qualified basis.
Because the San Rafael was financed with tax-exempt
bonds, the Partnership received its 4% federal credit
reservation without having to enter a competitive ranking
process. The Irvine Co. contracted with Merrill Lynch to
syndicate the credits. However, at this time, it appears that
the Irvine Co. will hold them internally. In the event the
Irvine Co. decides to sell the tax credits, the "market value"
would be in the range of $2.23 million to $2.62 million, based
on an internal rate of return on the annual benefits of
approximately 25%.
Rental Income Summary
Affordability Summary
Bedroom Total Units Affordable
Floorplan Count Units V.L./ Low /Mod.-2
A One 44 15 2 3
B One 84 29 4 7
C Two 32 11 2 8
D Two 22 8 1 2
E Two 48 17 3 4
F Two 16 6 1 1
1 Two 38 13 2 3
2 Two 38 13 3 3
3 Three 30 11 2 2
4 Three 30 11 2 2
Totals 382
Percent of Total
134
35%
20
5%
30
8%
Rental Summary
Bedroom Rent Levels
Floorplan Count Market V.L. Low Mod.-2
One
One
Two
Two
Two
Two
Two
Two
Three
Three
$ 885
885
1,035
1,035
1,050
1, 050
1,225
1, 225
1,325
1,325
$525
525
591
591
591
591
591
591
656
656
$840
840
945
945
945
945
945
945
1,050
1,050
$1,260
1,260
1,417
1,417
1,417
1,417
1, 417
1,417
1,575
1,575
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Projected First Year Income and Expense Summary:
Revenue
*Net Rental Income
Market Rent Units $2,411,000
Income Restricted Units 1,501,000
Other Income 20,000
Total Revenue 3,932,000
Operating Expenses
Management and Administration 347,000
Advertising and Promotion 50,000
Maintenance - Buildings 305,000
Maintenance - Grounds 158,000
Utilities 125,000
Property Tax/Mello Roos 320,000
Assessment District 85,000
Management Fee 154,000
Total Operating Expenses 1,544,000
(As % of Total Revenue) 39.3%
Net Operating Income: $2,388,000
* Based occupancy rate of 99% for low-income units and 95%
for moderate and market-rate units.
Profitability:
In analyzing the financial feasibility of San Rafael, the
Irvine Co. measured the projected financial outcome of the San
Rafael in its current program against that of a 100% market-
rate rental project of the same physical characteristics. The
examination concluded that the mixed-income program would be
equally as profitable as a market-rate program. The following
summarizes this analysis:
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Profitability Analysis
Project Investment:
Land at Market
Building Costs
Finance Costs
Lease-Up Costs
Total Investment
Project Financing:
Conventional Loan
Land (Equity)
Tax-Exempt Bonds
Subsidized Loans
Total
Cash Required
Current
Proiect
$9,550,000
28,600,000
2,600,000
600,000
41,350,000
0
9,550,000
28,000,000
2r050r000
39,600,000
1,750,000
100%
Market Rate
$9,550,000
28,600,000
2,500,000
1,000,000
41,650,000
26,500,000
9,550,000
0
0
36,050,000
5,600,000
Financial Ratios:
Overall Yield
Return on Cash
(Avg. Yrs 1-5)
Internal Rate of Return
Pre-Tax
After-Tax
6.3%
9.1%
12.5%
15.7%
7.9%
9.7%
13.3%
15.0%
Profitability measures are based on the following additional
assumptions:
(1) Occupancy rates of 99% for very low- and low-income
units, 95% for moderate-income and market-rate units
(2) Annual income and expenses increase at 4%
(3) Conventional financing at 9.5% interest rate
(4) Holding period of 30 years; zero reversionary income
(5) Equity = land at market plus cash contributed
(6) Irvine Co. utilizes 100% of tax-credits
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As evidenced above, the mixed-income program is projected
to achieve an after-tax yield greater than that from the
hypothetical market-rate project. This is primarily
attributable to the high level of low-cost financial leverage
and tax-credit benefits attainable under the mixed-income
program. Though difficult to quantify, the affordable nature
of San Rafael results in a reduced exposure to market
associated risk, increasing the project yield on a risk-
adjusted basis. Additionally, the satisfaction of inclusionary
requirements for other developable parcels within Westpark
will have a positive effect on the overall profitability of
the Irvine Company.
Looking Back
The Irvine Co. is generally pleased with the progress of
the San Rafael project. In hindsight, it would have become
more familiar, earlier in the process, with the financial
intricacies of the tax credit; specifically, the accounting of
the "qualified basis" calculation. In the writer's opinion,
one of the most strategic decisions made in the course of the
development process was that of bringing Bridge Housing to the
project. In the tense political climate, the Irvine Co. could
only benefit from the added credibility that an experienced
non-profit brings in dealing with the public officials.
CHAPTER THREE
WINFIELD HILL
A PROJECT STUDY OF A MIXED-INCOME
SINGLE FAMILY HOME/MULTI-FAMILY RENTAL DEVELOPMENT OF
MARTIN DEVCON PROPERTIES AND BRIDGE HOUSING CORPORATION
The information presented in the following case study was
obtained through interviews and written information provided
by William Fleissig, of Martin Devcon Properties, San Jose,
California.
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WINFIELD HILL
General Description
In a push to narrow the widening gap between local
housing costs and personal income, the San Jose City Council
voted overwhelmingly in June of 1992 to approve the nearly $50
million Winfield Hill mixed-income residential project in
Almaden Valley. Winfield Hill is an undertaking of Martin-
Devcon Properties and the non-profit Bridge Housing
Corporation. Martin-Devcon is joint venture of The Martin
Group and Devcon Construction, Inc. The Martin Group, has
become one of the largest development companies in the Bay
Area with a total portfolio exceeding $1 billion. Devcon, the
largest construction firm in Santa Clara County, has been a
major factor in the growth of Silicon Valley. Aimed at
easing the city's affordability crisis, the project is
targeted to families and individuals earning from $15,000 to
$70,000 annually. The development consists of 84 single family
detached homes priced between $215,000 and $240,000 and 144
rental units renting from $400 to $800 per month.
Approximately 20% of the homes will be subsidized and set-side
for moderate-income families. All 144 apartment units will be
set-aside for very low- and low-income households.
Bite Location
The Winfield Hill Site is located on Winfield Boulevard
in the Almaden Valley area of south San Jose (Santa Clara
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County), a prestigious residential neighborhood. The site is
directly across from Lake Almaden Park, and a four minute walk
to the Almaden Light Rail Station. A major shopping mall and
four schools are located within a two mile radius of the site.
The intersection of Routes (85) and (87) is situated under 1.5
miles from the site, offering convenient access.
Project Program
Upon completion, the project will contain both single-
family detached and a multi-family rental components, the
single-family element being the focus of this discussion.
Overall, the project density will be 19.5 units per gross
acre.
The singe-family element will consist of 84 detached
homes on 7.25 acres (12 units per gross acres). Homes will
range from 1,300 to 1,425 square feet situated on private,
3,760 square foot lots. Targeted for first time buyers, all
units will feature 3 bedrooms, 2.5 baths, and 1 or 2 car
garages. This portion of the project will be built in phases
of approximately 20 units, depending on market conditions,
with the first phase scheduled to break ground in March of
1993 and to become available for occupancy in July of 1993.
The multi-family rental element will contain 144
apartments on approximately 4.5 acres (32 units per gross
acre). One, two, and three bedroom units will be marketed to
low- and very low- income renters. A play area, community
house, swimming pool, and possibly a day care facility will be
shared by renters and home owners. The multi-family element
will built in one phase which is scheduled to break ground in
March of 1993 and become available for occupancy in March of
1994.
Political Context
In the San Francisco Bay Area, San Jose included, housing
affordability problems are among the worst in the nation. The
high-tech boom of Silicon Valley in the early 1980's resulted
in substantial employment growth and demand for housing in
Santa Clara County and throughout the Bay Area. Although Bay
Area prices were high prior to this period of growth, the
increased demand for housing combined with extremely
restrictive growth and land-use regulations imposed by many
communities, pushed home prices and rents to even higher
levels.
The city of San Jose has been relatively responsive to
the affordability crisis. However, up until recently, most of
its efforts have been geared toward providing for the moderate
income-households (80%-120% of area median income), as opposed
to low- and very low-income households. In an effort to
respond to this situation as well as to growing concerns about
traffic congestion, in the spring of 1991 the city council
adopted a Housing Initiative Study conducted by the San Jose
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Planning Department, which called for promoting mixed-income
housing development in close proximity to transit stations.
Additionally, the initiative called for the dispersion of low-
income housing outside of its traditional city core location.
This theme carried over into the city's recently adopted
housing element of its General Plan. The end result of this
policy was a local government very much in support of mixed-
income housing development on the urban fringe, such as the
Winfield Hill project.
Motivation to Develop Affordable Housing
As discussed, both The Martin Group and Devcon
Construction are from commercial development backgrounds. In
becoming involved in affordable housing development, both
firms are responding to a severe slowdown in the commercial
development sector and tightening capital market conditions.
In terms of the capital markets, financing for
acquisition and development of commercial and market-rate
residential projects is scarce. The Martin Group believes this
situation will persist for several years but believes projects
containing affordable housing elements will attract lenders
seeking to receive CRA credits.
In terms of risk, the insatiable demand for affordable
housing eliminates the market-oriented risk associated with
most development. Likewise, affordable housing projects carry
relatively heavy political risk during the pre-development
stage in terms of obtaining entitlements. The Martin Group is
in favor of "exchanging" the "back-end" market risk for the
"front-end" political risk. According to Martin, the financial
consequences associated with a failed completed project are
typically much more severe than those associated with a failed
proposed project. Additionally, in contrasting urban infill
sites to outlying suburban sites, The Martin Group believes
the former to carry significantly less political risk, and
will continue to concentrate its efforts in this area.
views its entrance into the affordable housing business
as not only a response, but part of a solution to the
commercial property market problems plaguing northern
California. believes that over the long-term, its
contribution to an affordable housing stock will at least in
part, help to create demand for commercial construction
through its positive effect on local employers and the
economy.
Decision to Joint-Venture with Bridge Housing
As of this writing, The Martin Group is working in
partnership with Bridge Housing on six developments in the Bay
Area. The Martin Group believes the non-profit status that
Bridge brings to the partnership to be a necessary element to
Martin's involvement in affordable housing development.
In terms of financing, Martin Devcon judges a non-profit
status to offer an advantage in accessing federal, state and
local funds, necessary in funding any affordable housing
project. As discussed in further detail below, the joint-
venture partnership, Winfield Partners, financed the entire
land acquisition and pre-development expenses of $8.25 million
with funding from San Jose's tax-increment pool. This local
subsidy allows Martin Devcon 100% project financing.
With regard to entitlements, although Martin Devcon
played an active role in the public approval process
associated with Winfield Hill, it recognizes the credibility
Bridge generally has with local governments as an experienced
non-profit with a proven track-record. As outlined below, the
city of San Jose was in support of the housing that Winfield
Hill would offer. Consequently, although Bridge was actively
involved in obtaining project entitlements, its role in this
process was less crucial than that associated with projects in
other locales.
Bridge's Motivation to Joint-Venture
Before outlining the structure of the Winfield Hill
Partnership, it is important to briefly note Bridge's
motivation behind the joint-venture arrangement:
In an environment where demand far outweighs supply of
affordable housing, Bridge's primary goal is to provide the
communities of the Bay Area with the greatest number of units
possible through leveraging its resources. Since the work
involved in completing small projects is virtually equal to
that associated with larger developments, the easiest way to
achieve this goal is through building large-scale projects.
At the local level, for the same reasons as Bridge,
municipalities responding to the affordability crisis and
State housing element law are also in favor of producing large
blocks of housing. However, they recognize from a political
standpoint that communities are significantly more receptive
to projects which act to disperse the lower-income households
among other segments of the population. As a result, local
officials are promoting large-scale, mixed-income
developments.
The above considered, Bridge's goals are most efficiently
achieved within the context of a mixed-income development by
partnering with a financially sound for-profit developer
ultimately responsible for the moderate and/or market-rate
portion of a project. The financial strength of the partner
will typically allow it to access financing on a scale that
Bridge is unable to independently. Although not stipulated
under the Winfield Hill agreement, in certain cases, the for-
profit partner may carry the majority of a project's risk in
guaranteeing construction financing for the entire project.
The following is a brief outline of the Martin-
Devcon/Bridge partnership agreement.
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Partnership Structure
Prior to taking control of the Winfield site, Martin-
Devcon had been pursuing other projects with Bridge in Santa
Clara County. As mentioned, The Martin Group and Bridge are
involved in several developments together and consequently
have had the opportunity to become familiar with each other's
operations. Consequently, partnership agreement evolved with
the progress of the project.
As mentioned, Martin-Devcon's primary motivation for
partnering with Bridge was to gain access to subsidies and
foster the public approval process. With these and Bridge's
goals under consideration, the partnership agreement was
structured to allow the partnership (Winfield Partners) to
obtain the local subsidies and project entitlements as a
single entity. After this is achieved, the partners are
required to take sole responsibility for their respective
project elements.
Technically, the partnership agreement reads to the
affect that "the partners will jointly develop and master-plan
the project through the time at which a Planned Development
permit (PD) is issued." The PD is issued upon the city giving
its final approval of the subdivision map, the last approval
required before the site can be legally subdivided. According
to the agreement, the site will then be divided into two
parcels, Martin-Devcon taking title to the single-family home
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site, and Bridge taking title to the multi-family rental site.
Upon "separation", each party therefore has the
responsibility of independently raising required additional
financing for, and managing its piece of the development. A
stipulation was included to allow the parties, under certain
conditions, input into site-plan modifications made by the
other party subsequent to the separation of the project.
Additionally, a joint-use agreement will be executed outlining
the responsibilities of each party (Bridge and the future
homeowner association) with regard to the maintenance and use
of the common areas. Although many of Bridge's mixed-income
joint-venture agreements call for the for-profit partner to
subsidize Bridge's low-income element from profits derived
from the for-profit's portion of the project, the Winfield
agreement relieves both parties from any further financial
obligation to each other upon separation.
Site Acquisition
Martin-Devcon approached the previous land-owner in July
of 1991 and reached agreement on a letter-of-intent in
September, 1991. The Seller is a partnership which obtained
the site from Avon Corporation with entitlements to build 360
elderly care units. The final purchase price agreed upon was
$7.8 million. As part of this agreement, the general partner
of the selling party is entitled to one third of the residual
profits of Martin-Devcon's single-family home project. A
contingency period into April of 1992 was agreed upon, at
which time Martin/Devcon would begin to deposit non-refundable
installments of $20,000 per month with the Seller until
closing. Apparently, the Seller was responsible for debt
service of $40,000 per month on the land. The sale is
scheduled closed in July of 1992.
Entitlements
The approval process for Winfield Hill involved both
land-use entitlements as well as approvals for the allocation
of the local subsidies. The project received a negative
environmental declaration, relieving the requirement for an
EIR. Although the project fit within the existing zoning, the
City required Planning Commission and City Council approval
for Winfield Hill because of its PUD format. The following
discussion, outlined chronologically, relates to both funding
and land-use issues. A technical description of the local
subsidies appears in the "Sources of Funds" section below.
As described above, the City Council adopted a Housing
Initiative Study in the spring of 1991 which called for the
development of low- and very low-income housing within a
mixed-income context, dispersed outside downtown, in close
proximity to transit stations. To implement this, in late
August of 1991, the Housing Department published a Notice of
Funding Available (NOFA) for such projects. City Council would
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allocate $20 million in subsidized loans at discounted rates
through negotiations, to be leveraged, and used for land
acquisition and pre-development expenses.
Martin-Devcon obtained control of the site in September
of 1992. Upon producing a project program which fit within the
existing zoning and directly responded to the Housing
Initiative Study and the NOFA, Winfield Partners submitted its
proposal to the Housing Department in September of 1991. In
February Winfield received a "reservation of funding" for what
was essentially 50% of the city's available funds-San Jose's
largest development loan ever. In essence, this reservation
set the requested funds aside until the project was presented
to, and voted on, by City Council.
From the inception of the project, Winfield involved the
highest level of review-staff in numerous planning meetings.
The initial plan submitted to staff called for 292 units or 25
units per gross acre. The General Plan called for high density
housing (12-25 units per acre). Additionally, the transit-
close location and mixed-income program made the project
eligible for Transit Corridor Zoning and Affordable Housing
Density Bonuses, resulting in an allowable density of up to 40
units per acre. However, various site-planning constraints set
forth in the City's development standards resulted in planning
staff recommending to reduce the proposed density. With the
project financially feasible at a lower density, Winfield
Partners accepted most of the staff recommendations, aware of
the importance of staff support in future hearings with the
Planning Commission and City Council.
With broad-based support of the planning staff, the
Housing Department, the Chamber of Commerce, the local
Manufacturer's Association, the media, and the Almaden Valley
Association (an umbrella organization of the project area's
homeowner associations) , Winfield Partners did not expect any
opposition at the Planning Commission hearing. However, the
homeowner's association of the adjacent "Willow Creek"
subdivision appeared at the hearing to present its opposition
to the mixed-income project, under the guise of wanting to
preserve open space. The Planning Commission attempted to
appease the opposition by lowering the project density. This
change would only undermine the City Council's original
objectives and increase the cost of the housing. Shortly
thereafter, the City Council overturned this decision. In
early June of 1992, the Council voted 7-2 to approve the
project in its entirety and in late June, 11-0 to allocate the
city funding. The City Council viewed the project as a direct
response to the goals and objectives of the City's housing
policy.
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Development Budget
The remainder of the discussion will be focused on the
strategy behind the development of the single-family home
portion of the project, being managed by Martin Devcon. The
following is a preliminary breakdown of project costs:
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Development Costs
Description
Land - 7.25 Acres
@ $15.38/SF
Construction
Building
Site/Off-site
Contingency (5%)
Total Construction
Per SF
$42.50
52.50
17.50
3.50
73.50
Indirect Costs
* A/E 1.83
City Fees 11.40
Other Ind.'s. 0.61
Total Indirect Costs 13.84
Soft Costs
* Legal/Acct. 0.44
* Security/Maint. 0.66
Insurance/Bonds 0.88
* Title/Closing 1.00
Developer Overhead 4.38
Property Taxes 1.09
Other Soft Costs 1.09
Total Soft Costs 9.54
Selling Costs (3%) 5.15
Models/Sales Center 1.14
Financing Costs Excluding Land
Const. Loan Pts @ 1% 1.00
Interest Exp. @ 10% 6.35
Total Financing Costs 7.44
Per Unit
$ 57,857
72,037
23,809
4,771
100,189
2,500
15,500
833
18,833
595
893
1,190
1,369
5,952
1,488
1,488
12,976
7,024
1,548
1,488
8,631
10,119
Total
$4,860,000
6,015,188
2,000,000
400,759
8,415,947
210,000
1,302,000
70,000
1,582,000
50,000
75,000
100,000
115,000
500,000
125,000
125,000
1,090,000
590,000
130,000
125,000
725,000
850,000
Total Project Cost 172.50
Interest - assumes 4 phases of app.
* Shared with Bridge Housing
235,000 17,517,947
20 units over 1.5 years.
Financing Program
Acquisition and Development Financing
San Jose Housing Commission - Acquisition (2nd) $ 4,860,000
Plaza Bank of California - Construction (1st) 12,658,000
Total Capital 17,518,000
Permanent Homebuyer Financing
San Jose Housing Commission "Silent Second" Loans $1,250,000
San Jose Housing Commission Acquisition Loan:
These funds accessed under the $20 million NOFA were
raised through the City's tax-increment districts. Due to the
high-tech boom of the 1980's, the City of San Jose is one of
the state's most successful communities in raising tax-
increment funds from redevelopment districts. The city
established redevelopment areas not only downtown, but also in
its growing high-tech industrial areas where property taxes
grew as a result of new development.
As discussed, this particular NOFA was published to
respond to the Housing Initiative Study. It called for funds
to be leveraged; their use restricted to site acquisition and
pre-development expenses. Winfield Partners received an
allocation of $8.25 million to provide for the land purchase
of $7.8 million and $450,000 in pre-development expenses. Upon
division of the two sites, Martin-Devcon and Bridge would will
each, independently, carry its pro-rata share of the debt,
$4.86 million and $3.39 million respectively. Depending upon
the availability of City funds, between 17-25 homes will be
restricted to moderate-income families, defined in San Jose as
earning 110% or less than area median income of $59,500 (for
a family of four).
The note to Martin-Devcon is designed to allow the
developer to leverage the construction costs and the City to
participate in project profits. Additionally, a $1.25 million
portion of the debt will be credited to Martin-Devcon
(resulting in an outstanding loan of $3.61 million) and used
to subsidize the moderate-income purchasers.
Payment on the note is due after the primary lender is
satisfied in full. Interest will accrue at a rate of 6% only
upon the pro-rata use of City funds during construction.
Assuming average sale prices of $235,000 per unit, the primary
lender will be likely paid from the sale proceeds of the first
50 of the 84 homes. The $3.61 million debt to the City will
likely be repaid with the proceeds from the sale of the
following 20 units.
In terms of participation in profits, the City is
entitled to 40% of the net proceeds after Martin Devcon
receives a development fee in the amount of approximately $1.8
million. This fee is payable from proceeds only after the
loans from the City and primary lender are satisfied.
Accordingly, this will likely result in the City receiving 40%
of the sale proceeds of the last 4-5 units, or approximately
$470,000 at the completion of the project.
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Plaza Bank - Construction Financing:
According to Martin Devcon, the commercial banking
community has shown considerable interest in providing
construction financing for Winfield Hill. Plaza Bank, the
first bank approached, expressed immediate interest in the
project. Based in Detroit (as Comerica, Inc.), Plaza Bank's
primary focus in construction financing is single-family
housing priced at the affordable end of the market. According
to Plaza Bank, its interest in the project originates in the
site's sound location, the involvement of the City-both in
terms of subsidies and general support, and third, the
potential for CRA credits, regarded as an "extra benefit".
According to Martin Devcon, CRA credits, earned in serving
moderate-income households, and the limited market-risk
associated with affordable housing are the key factors
involved in attracting lenders.
In underwriting the $12.6 million loan, Plaza Bank
applied the following general requirements: First, hard equity
of 15-20% of total project cost is required. This is achieved
with the City's "loan" of $4.86 million dollars or roughly 27%
of costs. Second, Plaza Bank's maximum loan to appraised value
is 70-75%. The $12.6 million loan represents approximately 60%
of project value. Third, the bank requires the project to be
phased with funding for each phase released upon 50% of the
units of a prior phase being sold. Winfield Hill will be
phased in increments of approximately 20 units or two cul-de-
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sacs per phase, in addition to 3-4 models. Last, repayment of
115%-125% of the loan amount allocated to a house is required
upon a closing. The interest rate on said loan will be
floating at 1.5% over prime rate.
San Jose Housing Commission - silent Second Mortgages:
As mentioned, the City is crediting Martin Devcon for
$1.25 million of the $4.86 million (resulting in an
outstanding loan of $3.61 million dollars) which will be used
to subsidize moderate-income purchasers with "silent" second
mortgages. These second mortgages, limited to $73,000 per
unit, are expected to average $50,000 and will carry no
monthly payment obligation. Two options exist in the event a
borrower sells a home to a household earning greater than
moderate area income: Either the City will participate in the
property appreciation, or, the borrower will be required to
pay the principle loan amount, with interest, upon the sale.
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Sales Revenues and Profitability Projections
The following is a snapshot of an estimate of the
project's revenue stream, although the project will be built
over several phases:
Model 1 Model 2
Size (SF) 1,300 1,425
Cost $205,154 $211,716
Sale Price $225,000 $245,000
Profit $ 19,846 $ 33,284
Total Units 41 43
Gross Profit $813,686 $1,431,212
Total Gross Profit $2,244,898
Less Estimated City Share $470,000
Sub-Total $1,774,898
Less 33% to Land Seller $585,716
* Net Profit to Martin Devoon $1,189,181
* Not including $500,000 received as developer overhead.
Looking Back
As of this writing, Martin Devcon is generally pleased
with the proceedings of the project. In hindsight, more
attention would have been given to working with the "not in my
backyard" constituency and the Planning Commission.
Broad based support led the developers to believe there
would not be any opposition at the Planning Commission
hearing. In hindsight, Martin Devcon believes that it could
have gained support from the Willow Creek residents by
informally involving these people early in the planning stages
of the project. To the developer's surprise, the Planning
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Commission was not educated or influenced by the Housing
Department's recent studies and affordable housing policy. The
developers proceeded with the Commission assuming the
opposite, to find a very frustrating situation. Looking back,
they would have put forth a concerted effort to educate the
people of the Planning Commission on the project and its
response to the objectives of the City's goals.
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CHAPTER FOUR
NORMONT TERRACE
A PROJECT STUDY OF A MIXED-INCOME
MULTI-FAMILY CONDOMINIUM AND APARTMENT DEVELOPMENT
OF THE RELATED COMPANIES OF CALIFORNIA IN ASSOCIATION WITH
THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES
The information presented in the following case study was
obtained through interviews and written information provided
by William Witte, Principal, The Related Companies of
California.
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NORMONT TERRACE
General Description
In November of 1989, the Housing Authority of Los Angeles
(HACLA) awarded a partnership of The Related Companies and D&S
Development Co. the Exclusive Right to Negotiate a Disposition
and Development Agreement (DDA) with HACLA for the
redevelopment of its Normont Terrace public housing site in
the Harbor City community of Los Angeles. The Related
Companies is a national commercial and residential development
firm with substantial experience in low-income housing
development. Its affiliate, The Related Capital Corporation,
is the largest tax-credit syndicator in the country.
The 35.4 acre site contains 400 two-story apartments
constructed in 1942 as wartime housing. The April, 1989
Request For Proposals (RFP) issued by HACLA sought a proposal
which would replace the 400 units at no cost to the Housing
Authority. Because the buildings are structurally unsound and
obsolete, the current tenants support demolition and
redevelopment of the site. Upon completion, the $80 million
dollar mixed-income project will include 800 units; 400 for-
sale condominiums with an average price of $135,000,
affordable to most moderate-income households, and 400 units
to replace the existing housing stock-to be rented to very
low-income households at monthly rents ranging from $640 for
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one-bedroom units to $1,081 for four-bedroom units.
site Location
The Normont Terrace Site is located in a what is
currently a predominantly hispanic, lower working-class
neighborhood in the South Bay of Los Angeles, at the
intersection of Pacific Coast Highway (PCH) and Vermont Avenue
in Harbor City. The site is less than one half mile west of
the PCH exit on the Harbor Freeway (110), offering direct
freeway access to downtown Los Angeles and to the San Diego
Freeway (405).
The site represents the last major residential
development opportunity along the desirable PCH corridor which
connects the South Bay beach communities with West Los Angeles
and Los Angeles International Airport on the northwest, and
Long Beach and San Pedro on the southeast. It is within a
five-mile radius of the prestigious communities of Palos
Verdes and Rolling Hills and of major shopping centers on PCH
and in Torrance. Additionally, the site is within a 20-minute
drive of the major South Bay employment centers, including
UCLA/Harbor and Kaiser Permanente (across the street) Medical
Centers, the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, and the
heart of the Los Angeles aerospace industry.
Project Program
Site planning for the project is in the preliminary
stages. Conceptually, Related envisions a gated community of
40 to 80 unit clusters. All buildings will be integrated into
a project with a single identity in which open-space and
project amenities will be shared by owners and renters alike.
The unit-mix of the rental component will consist of
60 one-bedroom units, 210 two-bedroom units, 100 three-bedroom
units, and 30 four-bedroom units. The condominium unit-mix is
not yet defined but will likely contain a majority of two- and
three-bedroom units.
Amenities will include at least three swimming pools,
three tot-lot play areas, and community and child-care
facilities. one association will oversee the operational
management of the entire project.
Motivation to Develop Affordable Housing
The Related Companies has vast experience in all segments
of the development business. Within the residential sector, it
has been successful in responding to changing economic
conditions through altering its projects between the luxury
and low-priced end of the spectrum. Additionally, Related has
a long history of dealing with the complexities of mixed-
income programs as well as in the public arena.
As a result, management was confident in Related's
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ability to undertake this complex project and viewed Normont
Terrace as a unique opportunity within a sluggish development
climate. It believes the national attention it expects to gain
in connection with the undertaking may result in opportunities
to apply the skills, unique to a project of Normont's nature,
in other locations.
Political Context
With the ultimate goal of recouping some value from its
inventory, in 1987, HACLA conducted a study of its of older
properties. The unique location and site characteristics of
Normont Terrace presented HACLA with an opportunity to achieve
its financial objectives. It believed the superb location and
large-scale development potential of the site would allow the
City to replace what is essentially an unlivable, fully
occupied housing project without any financial investment.
Upon making this determination, HACLA began working with
project residents to gain feedback on its findings. Primarily
working, poor families, the residents were very supportive of
the project, provided they received compensation for their
temporary relocations.
Request for Proposals:
In April of 1989, HACLA issued an RFP for the Normont
Terrace site within which three primary conditions were set-
forth:
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The project sponsor was to; (1) replace all 400 rental
units for existing residents, (2) finance the entire project
without local funding (although the discounted land
represented a substantial concession) and (3) provide for all
temporary resident relocations. Additionally, HACLA supported
the integration of income-classes within a mixed-income
proposal.
Response to Request For Proposals:
Apparently due to the project's size, complexity and the
conditions of the RFP, only four bidders responded to the RFP.
In addition to the Related/D&S joint-venture, HACLA received
proposals from Lincoln Properties, PSC Development Co. (an
affordable housing development firm from Salt Lake City), and
an independent developer from Los Angeles. HACLA reduced the
competition to PSC and Related. D&S eventually dropped out of
the Related joint-venture due to internal financial problems.
PSC proposed to build 1,150 rental units financed with
tax-exempt bonds to be guaranteed by FHA mortgage insurance.
Related proposed to build 1,200 units; 800 condominiums
integrated with 400 apartments, replacing the existing stock.
The apartments would be financed with tax credits and a
conventional mortgage; the condominiums with conventional
construction financing taken-out with individual mortgages.
The residents preferred PSC's rental proposal fearing
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Related's condominium sales would bring "rich people" to the
project. However, aware of FHA's financial problems at the
time, HACLA recognized the risk associated with PSC's
financing plan. It believed Related's proposal to be more
complex, but also more feasible, and granted Related the
Exclusive Right to Negotiate a DDA in November of 1989.
The Disposition and Development Agreement:
Project Program: After almost three years of
negotiations with HACLA, The Related Companies expects the
agreement to be signed by August of 1992. As discussed, the
original proposal consisted of 1,200 units; 800 condominiums
and 400 assisted apartments dispersed among the condominium
units. Negotiations have been lengthy, at least in part, due
to certain implications of HACLA's conditions.
In terms of integration, HACLA wanted to optimize the
degree to which renters were dispersed among condominium
owners. However HACLA was intent on replacing the 400 rental
units in a timely manner. Additionally, under tax credit
regulations, projects are required to be placed in service
within three years of a credit allocation. However,
construction financing arrangements for the condominium
component call for phasing this for-sale element at the pace
of absorption. To avoid exposure to potential delays in the
condominium phasing, which puts the tax credit funds and the
public housing replacement product at risk, HACLA will allow
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integration to occur to a lesser degree; on a building by
building basis. The 400 apartments will be built in a single
phase, the condominium phasing as determined by the
construction lender and response from the market.
The reduction from 800 to 400 condominium units resulted
from a variety of issues. HACLA was in favor of a less dense
project. It offered Related a commitment for project-based
Section-8 subsidy rental subsidies for the apartments in
return, at least in part, for a less dense project. In
conducting further market research, Related found that the
marketability of the 800 units would suffer from the high
density (33 per acre). Additionally, by lowering the density,
the project would no longer require costly subterranean
parking. Related believes the cost savings and risk mitigation
resulting from the lower density outweigh the potential
incremental profits of the higher density.
Project Based Section-8 Subsidy: As mentioned, HACLA has
agreed to allocate a portion of its allowable project-based
Section-8 funds to the rental component of Normont Terrace.
All units will receive 5 year contracts at HUD-restricted
rental rates. Although HACLA and HUD would guarantee Related
a 15 year project-based Section-8 rental subsidy, most
contracts are now issued for 5-year terms, with two 5-year
extensions.
77
Partnership With Tenant's Association: As part of the
DDA, Related will enter into a general partnership with the
current project's tenant association, a registered non-profit
organization. The association's legal status is that of
"managing general .partner". Strategically, this achieves two
objectives. First, granting residents a voice in the
operational management of their buildings will translate into
a "pride of ownership" which should result in more respect
for, and better maintenance of, the property. Second, the non-
profit participation within the general partnership qualifies
the low-income rental component for property tax exemption
under California law.
Ground Lease: In the context of its condominium program,
Related was in favor of purchasing the land in fee. However,
HACLA believed that the public would have a more positive
perception of the City's dealings if it held title to the land
under a lease agreement, notwithstanding the significant
discount inherent in the ground lease.
HACLA will lease the site to Related for a period of 99
years on a subordinated basis. In return, Related will prepay
$1 million to HACLA and $1 million to the tenants to be used
for social services at the commencement of construction.
Additionally, Related will be responsible for all tenant
relocation expenses, projected to be $1.5 million.
Attributing all land-related costs to the condominiums results
in an expense of $10,000 per unit, approximately $20,000-
$30,000 per unit "under market" .
Profit Distribution: The DDA calls for HACLA and the
existing tenants to participate in project profits. According
to the agreement, after the distribution of preferred returns
to any third-party limited partners, the profit will be
distributed 70% to Related, 25% to HACLA, and 5% to the tenant
association.
Entitlements
An EIR and Tract Map approval for the project will be
required. Because the project has enjoyed broad-based support
from local officials, a number of steps have been taken to
expedite the approval process.
Zoning:
In terms of Zoning, no further approvals are required.
The site is covered by the City of Los Angeles'
Wilmington/Harbor City Interim Control Ordinance, which
effectively downzoned the area when adopted in 1988. To
accommodate the proposed project density, the Ordinance was
amended in June of 1990, during DDA negotiations, to allow for
increased residential density within the affected area,
however, only for mixed-income developments. This
action served to give as-of-right zoning approval to the
project and limit future condominium competition in the area
to small, more expensive projects.
Environmental Review:
A proposed project in the City of Los Angeles which
requires the processing of a full EIR through the Planning
Department ordinarily requires 18 months for the EIR to be
certified by the Planning Commission. However, the Planning
Commission has agreed to allow the Housing Authority to act as
the lead agency for processing the EIR for Normont Terrace.
With no other EIR's to process, HACLA expects certification
within 8 months of the execution of the DDA.
Tract Map:
Because the site is, and will be publicly owned, and
affordable housing is at stake, expedited processing of the
preliminary tract map application is also expected. Although
formal actions by staff are not allowed prior to the
certification of an EIR, Related will begin working informally
with staff upon signing the DDA.
Waiver of City Fees:
Discussions with City officials has led Related to
believe that there will be an opportunity for the waiver of
certain city fees. This will be further investigated during
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the processing of entitlements. Related's development budget
(below) does not account for any waiver at this time.
Because the redevelopment will remove what most area
residents consider a blighted element from the community,
little if any opposition to the proposal is expected.
Accordingly, all entitlements are expected to be approved
within 12 to 16 months of the execution of the DDA.
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Preliminary Development Budget
Market-Rate Condominium Low-Income Low-Income
Description Condominium Units Per Unit Rental Units Per Unit
Land $1,000,000 $2,500 $0 $0
Relocation 750,000 1,875 750,000 1,875
NTCC Payment 1,000,000 2,500 0 0
Total Land, etc. 2,750,000 6,875 750,000 1,875
Direct Costs
Demolition 300,000 750 300,000 750
Common Area 1,750,000 4,375 1,750,000 4,375
Sitework & Grading 1,300,000 3,250 1,300,000 3,250
Off-site Costs 1,400,000 3,500 1,400,000 3,500
Construction 21,500,000 53,750 21,500,000 53,750
Contractor Fee (5%) 1,210,000 3,025 1,210,000 3,025
Contingency (5%) 1,210,000 3,025 1,210,000 3,025
Total Direct Costs 28,670,000 71,675 28,670,000 71,675
Indirect Costs
Fees & Permits 3,400,000 8,500 2,400,000 6,000
Arch. & Eng. 900,000 2,250 900,000 2,250
Soils, Geology 65,000 163 65,000 163
Property Taxes 250,000 625 0 0
Legal, Accounting 400,000 1,000 100,000 250
Ins., Taxes, License 250,000 625 125,000 313
DRE, H.O. Ass. Dues 200,000 500 200,000 500
Total Indirect Costs 5,465,000 13,663 3,790,000 9,475
Finance Costs
Construction Int. 3,000,000 7,500 1,900,000 4,750
Loan Fee (1.5%) 650,000 1,625 450,000 1,125
Perm. Loan Fee (4%) 0 0 750,000 1,875
Tax Credit App. Fee 0 0 165,000 413
Total Finance Costs 3,650,000 9,125 3,265,000 8,163
Developer O.H. & Fee 1,133,550 2,834 3,150,000 7,875
Total Costs 41,668,550 104,171 39,625,000 99,063
See note" for notes on cost calculations.
Financing Program
As of this writing, Related is not far enough into the
pre-development phase to begin the application process for its
financing. However, based on its experience in the affordable
housing industry and preliminary discussions with capital
sources, Related has determined the character of its financing
program. For the purpose of financing, the condominium and
rental elements will be treated individually.
Lov-Income; Rental Component:
40%-50% of costs to be financed with tax credits, the
remainder through a loan insured by FHA or FNMA.
As mentioned, the apartments will qualify for low-income
tax credits. 100% of the 400 units will be set-aside for
households earning under 50% of area median income. As Related
will apply for 9% credits, the project will be ranked in a
competitive application process. As result, in order to
compete, Related will agree to restrict rents for 55 years.
Related expects to receive 9% credit allocations on a
substantial qualified basis. Depending upon the market for
credits at the time of sale, the credits should generate
equity from corporate investors in an amount equal to 40%-50%
of development costs ($16.6 million - $20.8 million). Under
this structure, Related and the tenant association will retain
a 1% interest in the project as the general partner, the
credit investors a 99% interest as limited partners. Upon
completion, Related will most likely continue to manage the
apartments in exchange for property management fees.
The remainder of the low-income component of the
development costs will be financed with a conventional
construction loan. According to Related, projected first-year
operating-income will adequately carry the required debt at a
1.10 coverage ratio, assuming an interest rate in the range of
9%. The permanent financing will likely be obtained through
FNMA or FHA. The primary issue to resolved with regard to
this instrument is the mortgage insurance. According to
Related, a HUD associated entity is apt to be the only third
party provider of mortgage insurance comfortable enough with
the current Section-8 program (of 5 year contracts-discussed
above) to underwrite the mortgage guarantee. Hence, FHA
appears to be the most likely source of insurance-essential to
underwrite the first mortgage.
Condominium Component:
Construction financing for the condominium will probably
be obtained through conventional sources. Developer equity of
approximately 20% of project costs ($8 million-including all
payments to HACLA and the tenant association) is likely to be
required by the construction lender. Priced at approximately
$135,000 per unit, Related believes purchasers will be able to
qualify for attractive permanent loans through first-time
homebuyer programs offered by FHA, VA, or FNMA.
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Sales Revenues and Profitability Projections
The following is a snapshot of an estimate of the
condominium project's revenue stream, although this portion of
the project will be built over several phases:
* Total Sales Revenues
Less Marketing Costs (6%)
Gross Revenues
Less Costs
Gross Profit
Less HACLA Share (25%)
Less Tenant Assoc.Share (5%)
** Net Profit to Related Co's.
$54,500,000
3,264,000
51r136,000
(41,668,550)
9,467,450
(2,366,862)
(473,373)
6,627,215
* Assuming average sale price of $136,000
** Not including developer fees of $4,283,000
It is estimated that this profit will be generated on a
cash investment of approximately $8 million. However, assuming
construction commences 18 months from the execution of the
DDA, depending upon absorption, Related should complete the
phased condominium project 5-6 years from the execution of the
DDA.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
The following discussion is based on the material
presented in the preceding four chapters and discussions with
development professionals, public-sector housing specialists
and real estate lending professionals listed in the "notes"
section following the conclusion.
The primary goal of the research was to determine the
role of the for-profit developer within the affordable- family
housing industry in California. As affirmed by the three case
studies and by discussions with developers, lenders and
housing specialists at the state and local government levels,
affordable housing development, under certain conditions, does
represent a profitable opportunity. Additionally, in contrast
to commercial- industrial or market-rate residential
development, the risks associated with market demand for
affordable housing are minimal. Success within this arena,
however, involves working through a complex system concerning
local- and state-level public agencies as well as various
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suppliers of capital. The participants within this system are
directly and indirectly linked; pressured, motivated and
limited, by federal and state regulations Wall Street, special
interests, and/or community groups. To effectively interact
within this framework, the developer must be knowledgeable of,
and sensitive to, these connections.
To successfully work through the institutional "maze",
local government support is critical. Though essential within
all development practice, local support is especially
important for affordable housing projects in overcoming
opposition from local citizen groups and more importantly, in
the midst of the credit-crunch, to arrange delicately layered
financing programs. Structuring these financing packages, the
most difficult component of an affordable housing development,
often hinges on the granting of substantial concessions at the
local level.
Relationship of Local Concessions to Financing Strategy:
The following discussion demonstrates the importance of
these local subsidies in the context of the developer's
financing strategy. There appear to be widely accepted models
associated with each of three project program types:
(1) Multi-Family Rental; 100% Low-Income:
Within a program of 100% restricted units, developers
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typically restrict all units for households earning 60% or
less than median income to qualify for a maximum 9% tax credit
allocation. Syndication proceeds from these credits will
typically generate equity in an amount equal to 40%-50% of
project costs. Operating income will support construction and
permanent first mortgages in the range of 30%-40% of total
project costs. The remaining "equity" may take the form of
subordinted-deferred local loans, local cash or land write-
downs, and/or equity contributed by the developer.
(2) Multi-Family Rental; Mixed-Income:
In the context of a mixed-income program, project
sponsors aim to restrict 20%-40% of the units to qualify for
tax-exempt bond financing and 4% tax credits. In addition to
allowing for income to support a substantial bond issue,
limiting the restricted units to a 40% ratio seems to be a
response to a threshold set by tax-credit investors. A mix
exceeding 40% restricted units is believed to reduce the
marketability of the market-rate units. The share of proceeds
generated from tax-exempt bond issues (60%-75% of project
costs) is inversely related to that generated from the sale
of 4% tax-credits (10%-20%), as increased rent restrictions
which generate tax-credits decrease the amount of debt a
project is able to support. The remaining "equity" funds, as
detailed above, will take the form of local concessions and/or
cash contributions of the project sponsor.
(3) Moderate-Income Single- & Multi-Family Homes:
In locales where land is too expensive to support
affordable (to moderate-income) single-family home or
condominium development, affordability is typically enhanced
through municipalities providing land write-downs, discounted
site acquisition loans, and/or silent-second mortgages for
qualified home-buyers. Construction financing is obtained
through conventional sources.
Reflecting on these financing models, it can be seen that
local concessions are integral to successfully financing a
development. The competitive application process for 9% tax
credits calls for preference to be granted to projects
receiving either 15% of total costs in local subsidies or 30%
in developer cash contributions. Consequently, without the
local subsidies, to compete for tax-credits, a developer is
requiried to contribute equity in an amount too great to
result in an acceptable rate of return, given HUD's
restrictions on developer fees and limited project cash flow,
due to the magnitude and longevity of rent restrictions.
Likewise, mixed-income, bond financed projects require local
support to formally approve the tax-exempt issue. Finally,
sponsors of subsidized single-family home or condominium
projects receive 100% of their financial incentives at the
local level.
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Gaining Local Support:
The following are the primary areas of concern in gaining
project support at the local level:
Local Housing Policy:
As discussed in Chapter Two, State-level housing
specialists have been implementing policy to promote support
of affordable housing production at the local level. However,
most cities have yet to initiate truly pro-active policy. From
the developer's perspective, it is critical to operate within
communities where local policy supports low-income family
housing. The risks associated with waging a "battle" for what
is essentiallly an as-of-right project in a hostile political
environment will ultimately lead to a lost "war", via costly
delays, litigation, and/or capital deficiencies due to the
lack of local subsidies.
Project Scale:
In terms of project size, most municipalities which are
responding to the affordability crisis are in favor of
producing large blocks of housing. However, they recognize
that communities are more receptive to projects which act to
disperse the lower-income households among other segments of
the population. As a result, local officials are generally
promoting large-scale, mixed-income developments.
From the developer's perspective, large-scale projects
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(often referred to as 50 units and greater) are favorable not
only politically, but also in terms of efficiency. Regardless
of project size, the framework within which all subsidized
development sponsors work invovles an extremely tedious and
lengthy pre-development process. The cost and effort of
obtaining subsidies and approvals within this system is too
great to distribute across a relatively small project. 3
Where profit margins are lower, relative to those historically
"earned" in market-rate development, adequate volume is
necessary to justify the effort and risk involved during the
"front-end" of the development process. Lending institutions
also favor larger projects, frequently offering explicit
pricing incentives for larger-scale developments.
Public/Private Partnership Format:
Public perception of for-profit development in subsidized
housing may be the single greatest barrier to entry into this
business segment. In general, government appears to judge non-
profit organizations to be more suitable for this arena.
Officials contend that the "sole interest" of these
organizations-providing quality affordable housing, is
direclty aligned with those of the public. The belief is that
for-profit operators are not able to provide maximim
affordability while meeting their yield requirements. In terms
of funding, governments tends to believe that subsidizing for-
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profit developers merely increases their profit margins.
Although there are valid arguments against these
perceptions64, to gain local support and access to critical
local subsidies in the current environment, it has become
increasingly important (subsequent to the media-inflated HUD
scandals) that for-profit firms enter into "public"- private
partnerships. As can be seen by the partnership structures
discussed within the three case studies, these can vary in
scope from consulting agreements to full-scale equity-sharing
arrangements. By pairing up directly with municipalities as
The Related Co's. did with the Los Angeles Housing Authority,
or with private non-profit development firms such as Bridge
Housing, as did Martin Devcon and The Irvine Co., for-profit
firms are able to benefit from their partner's political
appeal and access to essential subsidies.
In an environment where demand far outweighs supply of
affordable housing, the primary goal of the non-profit
developer and the public housing agency is to penetrate the
affordable housing need as deeply as possible. Responding to
community preference in developing mixed-income projects, the
goals of these organizations are most efficiently met by
partnering with financially sound for-profit developers
ultimately responsible for the moderate and/or market-rate
portion of a project. The financial strength of the for-profit
partner will typically allow it to access financing on a scale
that the non-profit organization is unable to independently.
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Profitability - Is it Worth the Effort?:
In contrast to traditional commercial/industrial and
market-rate residential development, the risks associated with
market demand of the final affordable housing product are
minimal. Most of the risk associated with affordable housing
development is involved during the predevelopment process;
working within the maze. Substantial time and capital is
involved in packaging a project for land-use approvals and
capital commitments, neither of which are gaurenteed. However,
the magnitude of this "front-end" exposure is minimal relative
to the market-associated, financial risks of a completed
market-rate speculative project.
In terms of profitability, to maintain the necessary
levels of affordability required to compete and qualify for
scarce and essential subsidies, profit margins tend to be
relatively lower than those traditionally "expected" from
market-rate, speculative development. In fact, competetion for
subsidies to fund the lower-income components of mixed-income
developments, such as tax credits and (what were) RHCP funds,
often results in affordability restrictions of such magnitude
that these components are not justifiable from a profitability
perspective. However, to gain local support for a project in
its entirety, and respond to the needs of the public, the
lower-income component is a necessity.
The San Rafael, Winfield Hill, and Normont Terrace
projects represent creative examples of profitable
incorporation of lower-income elements into mixed-income
developments. The Irvine Co., partnering with Bridge Housing
was able to structure financing and land use programs which
allowed the Irvine Co. to satisfy the inclusionary
requirements for several Westpark sites while earning an
acceptable return on the subject site. In the case of Winfield
Hill, the partnership with Bridge called for the private non-
profit to independantly manage the development of the lower-
income element, allowing Martin Devcon to develop the more
profitable single-family element. Accessing City funding
precluded the need for Martin Devcon to contribute any hard
equity. In exchange for replacing a Los Angeles low-income
public housing project, essentially without profit, The
Related Companies will earn a generous return from its
condominium development, primarily as a result of its
attractive ground lease with the Housing Authority.
In summary, as can be seen within the context of three
case studies, and as conveyed through discussions with various
professionals connected to the affordable housing development
business, for-profit opportunity does exist in this segment
of the industry. However, succeeding in this arena involves
an in depth knowledge of, and ability to negotiate, a complex
institutional maze. The institutional and political
sophistication necessary for the negotiation is far in advance
of the principles associated with the "traditional"
94
development process.
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